Skip to main content

Full text of "Intoxicating Liquors. Search and Seizure. Seizure without Warrant Held Not Unlawful"

See other formats


Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World 

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in 
the world by JSTOR. 

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other 
writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the 
mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. 

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this 
resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial 

Read more about Early Journal Content at 
journal-content . 

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people 
discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching 
platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit 
organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please 


the customers of a malting concern to violate their contracts, an injunc- 
tion was granted to restrain such action. American Malting Co. v. Keitel 
(1914), 217 Fed. 672. And it has been held that an injunction will lie to 
prevent a landlord from intimidating his tenant by violence into abandon- 
ing his crop before harvest, and thus violating his contract. Bussell v. 
Bishop (Ga. 1921), 110 S. E. 174. 

The instant case is in line with the decided weight of authority in hold- 
ing that an injunction will be issued to restrain a stranger from attempting 
to induce the breach of a contract not illegal or contrary to public policy. 

Intoxicating Liquors — Search and Seizure — Seizure without War- 
rant Held Not Unlawful. — In response to a fire alarm, police officers 
went with firemen to the home of accused, and after the fire was extin- 
guished went with the accused and firemen into a shed adjoining the 
house and connected therewith, and which had been the seat of the fire. 
There they found a still, bottles and barrels containing liquor and mash, 
which they seized, the search and seizure being without a warrant. The 
accused petitioned the court that the articles be returned to him, on the 
grounds that such search and seizure amounted to a violation of Amend- 
ment IV of the Constitution of the United States, and of article I, sec- 
tion 8, of the Constitution of Connecticut, providing against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and prescribing the use of duly procured warrants. 
Held, the search and seizure was not unlawful. State v. Magnano (Conn. 
1922), 117 Atl. 550. 

It is quite generally held that the Fourth Amendment to the United 
State Constitution is not binding on the State courts, and affords no 
protection against the misconduct of police officers not acting under any 
claim of federal authority. Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U. S, 383, 
34 Sup. Ct. 34, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177. But this clause appears also in 
all State Constitutions in slightly varying language. State v. Peterson 
(Wyo. 1920), 194 Pac. 342, 13 A. L. R. 1284. Whether search and seizure 
without a warrant violates the clause of the State Constitutions seems 
to depend more on the search than on the seizure. If the search be un- 
necessary, if the contraband article be fully disclosed and open to the 
eye and hand, or, to borrow the phrase of the Kentucky Court, 
if the liquor "discover itself," then no warrant is necessary and it may 
be lawfully seized. Bowling v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1922), 237 S. W. 381; 
State v. Quinn (1918), 111 S. C. 174, 97 S. E. 62, 3 A. L. R. 1500. 

In some states it is held that the police may search any place to which 
they have lawful access. Smith v. Jerome (N. Y. 1905), 47 Misc. Rep. 22, 
93 N. Y. S. 202. Consent of the owner of the premises makes search 
lawful, and one who consents to have his property searched by an officer 
without a warrant has no right of action for an illegal search. McClurg 
v. Brenton (1904), 123 Iowa 368, 98 N. W. 881, 101 Am. St. Rep. 323, 65 
L. R. A. 519. And the search is not unconstitutional when made by 
invitation of accused's wife. Smith v. McDuffee (1914), 72 Ore. 276, 142 
Pac. 558, 143 Pac. 929, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 947. Even the consent and aid 
of a servant or agent, left in charge of the premises, keeps the search 
from being a violation of the constitutional provision. State v. Griswold 
(1896), 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046, 33 L. R. A. 227. 

But for an officer without a valid search warrant or consent to search 


the premises for an alleged offender, or to take possession of property 
discovered in such unlawful search, violates the provision of the con- 
stitution, and the guilt or innocence of the owner of the premises is im- 
material. Youman v. Commonweatlh (1930), 189 Ky. 152, 324 S. W. 860, 
13 A. L. R. 1303. 

Ever since the expression "A man's house is his castle" crystallized 
into the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and later found 
its way into all State constitutions, it has been considered one of the 
most effective safeguards of American liberty. And, although a large 
number of courts are apparently willing to warp, twist, and evade it at 
any time to secure a conviction, there is still a respectable number of 
courts holding that this tendency to obtain convictions by unlawful 
seizures, destructive of rights secured to the people, should find no sanc- 
tion. Weeks v. United States, supra; State v. Peterson, supra; Youman v. 
Commonwealth, supra. 

For a general discussion of the different views taken by the courts 
under the National Prohibition Act, see 8 Va. Law Rev. 399. 

Master and Servant — Workmen's Compensation Act — Employee Com- 
pensated for Total Disability, Though Injury Merely Aggravated 
Prior Disease. — The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant company, 
was suffering from a tuberculous and syphilitic condition, which had be- 
come localized in the right shoulder. Said condition had become stable, 
and did not disable or incapacitate the plaintiff for his work as a laborer. 
On August 20, 1920, the plaintiff received a blow on the right shoulder 
joint, arising in the course of and out of his employment, which imme- 
diately aggravated and accelerated the tuberculous and syphilitic condi- 
tion previously existing and produced a condition incapacitating the 
plaintiff to work from the date of the injury, August 21, 1920, to May 
31, 1931. Pub. Acts 1919, c. 142, sec. 1, amending Gen. St. 1918, sec. 
5341, which is a part of the Workman's Compensation Law of Connecti- 
cut provided that, in case of aggravation of a disease, compensation is 
allowed only for the proportion of the disability reasonably attributed to 
the injury. Held, compensation awarded for entire incapacity. Bongia- 
latte v. H. Wales Lines Co. et al. (Conn. 1922), 117 Atl. 696. 

Cases of this character have arisen in many of our States, and the 
decisions of each State have depended very strongly upon the phraseology 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act of that particular State. 

An employee having latent tuberculosis, received a personal injury, 
arising out of and in the due course of his employment, which aggra- 
vated and accelerated his latent tuberculosis into active tuberculosis, from 
which he died. His dependents were entitled to compensation under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Markiowicz 
et al. (Ind. 1921), 129 N. E. 710; McGoey v. Turin Garage & Supply Co. 
et al. (N. Y. 1921), 195 App. Div. 436, 186 N. Y. S. 697. And when the 
employee has a pre-existing disease which is aggravated and accelerated 
by an accidental injury in the course of employment, compensation may 
be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but the accidental 
injury must be the immediate or proximate cause of death. Jakub v. In- 
dustrial Commission et al. (1919), 288 111. 87, 123 N. E. 263; Peoria Rail- 
way Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board (1917), 279 111. 352, 116 N. E. 651.